A few posts back I mentioned the idea that one might be able to propose a middle-gound type view between the traditional view of hell and universalism. This can be done by saying human persons are human contingently, and that no human person ends up in hell. In this paper, I work that idea out in a bit more detail. But still, the paper is more like notes than a polished piece.
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First of all, I love this as a possibility and think it’s fascinating. I think it fits with the idea that the “universalist passages” are categorical in nature (i.e. not talking about individuals). I also don’t know that is necessary. (I think Boyd & Eddy talk about the universlist passages in one of the video clips here: http://www.patheos.com/blogs/thepangeablog/2011/10/13/can-you-lose-your-salvation-greg-boyd-and-mark-driscoll-in-dialogue/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+thepangeablog+%28the+Pangea+Blog+%28Patheos%29%29).
Secondly, Jesus was fully human. Jesus did not sin. He is at least one exception to the rule that all means all. So then “all” doesn’t necessarily mean “all.” “All” can be used hyperbolically.
Comment by Christian Penrod — October 20, 2011 @ 10:18 am |
I am very sympathetic to this train of thought. It seems very plausible that some people through their choices are actively causing the imago Dei to atrophy. I have two main concerns: first, those people Jesus talks about who come after it’s too late, clamoring to be let in, still seem to be in possession of their faculties. They have an awareness of their awful fate, and seem to have the presence of mind to try (futilely) to avoid it. This would suggest that at least some people consigned to hell were not fully dehumanized. But perhaps I am making too much of a condensed, highly figural description of that ultimate fate. The other concern is that the possibility of dehumanization has provided license throughout history for truly despicable inhumanity to our fellow human beings. It seems historically that the postulation of an essential humanity has been an important safeguard against oppression and degradation. After all, haven’t all exterminators and perpetrators of genocide argued that their victims had either lost or never had full humanity? This does not necessarily mean that the dehumanization thesis is wrong, just that we need to be very careful in the specific claims we make in individual cases. There are many testimonies of people who had been written off as hopeless and lost being subsequently redeemed by God’s grace.
Comment by henotheist — October 20, 2011 @ 10:03 pm |
Christian,
Excellent point about Jesus being an exception to the Romans 3:23 “all”. I’d never thought of that.
Heno,
Thanks for your comment. Your concerns are good ones, but ones that I think can be quelled. Taking them in reverse order: it is a mistake to think that the only value humans have is by virtue of possessing the imago Dei. They can still have tremendous value by virtue of being, most fundamentally, persons. The angels, animals, and creation itself has tremendous value, but presumably lack the imago Dei (recall in Genesis God calls creation good, and humans very good. The loss of the imago Dei could simply be the loss of the “very”).
Moreover, no fellow human could ever justifiably say when another has lost or irreparably damaged his/her imago Dei. This seems to be something only God could be privy to. It is tantamount to knowing whether that person is saved. It would be presumptuous to think we should have that kind of knowledge.
As I suggested above, the train of thought is that humans are more fundamentally persons than human. It is by virtue of being persons that we have the kind of capacities you have in mind (an awareness of self and others). Persons generically have such capacities. The capacity I suggested would be lost is the ability to make morally significant choices (A morally significant choice is one such that it is made without any sufficient causally determining factors and is either wrong or right. It is not as clear to me whether persons generically have this capacity).
Comment by camcintosh — October 20, 2011 @ 10:35 pm |
camcintosh,
Interesting and creative thoughts. There’s a couple questions I have, however. (1) This may be related to the ‘fireman objection’ but it is not explicitly stated, but your solution has a ring of ad hocness to it. Now, I know that the ad hoc objection is a difficult one to pin to down, but there is a nagging feeling that is just positing something simply to avoid a problem. Consider the liar paradox, what if my solution was merely the following:
(L) For any sentence S, if S is an instance of the liar paradox, then S does not have a truth value.
It seems clear to me that this is no solution at all! The real question is why (L) should be take as true. Now, I wouldn’t say your strategy is very similar to (L), but I would suggest focusing on clarifying the differences between your strategy and this strategy for handling the liar paradox.
(2) Another issue that I would like to raise is your response takes advantage of a distinction between humans and persons. But perhaps the universalist could just reformulate their objection using persons. One response you might take would be to posit another distinction between persons, and something else that would be a good candidate for whatever kind of entities we are. But, the universalist could just reformulate their argument using whatever other candidate you use. The reason the universalist has so many options here is, in part, because of the open ended nature of the two of the three passages you quote. Romans 11 and 1 Corinthian 15, at least in the translations you offer, don’t mention persons or humans or any other kind term for the universal quantifier to range over, so the domain is ambiguous here. Hence, whatever kind term you wish to exploit in your argument, the universalist could just as easily reform their argument using your kind term of choice. What you need to show here is that the domain of the quantifiers that the universalist passages range over is a different domain as the quantifiers that range over the damnation passages. Presumably, the universalist will want to say that it is the same range, and the universalist passages give us reason to think that the damnation passages are limited in some way. Presumably, the reverse will be true for the traditionalist. It seems you adopt the burden of showing why we ought to take the domains to be two rather than one. What is tricky here, is that in at least two of the passages you mention, the domain is blatantly ambiguous.
Comment by CGibbs — November 10, 2011 @ 4:12 pm |
Dr. Gibbs,
Thanks for your insightful comments! Let me respond to each in turn.
1. I do not think my solution to the so-called damning objection is similar to the solution to the liar’s paradox you suggest. The solution to the liar’s paradox seems ad hoc because of the clause “if S is an instance of the liar paradox.” But what similar, weasely clause is there in my solution? What I suggest is a very specific and concrete way to retain logical consistency. Where (L) is just some solution or other, I must disagree with your claim that “the real question is why (L) should be take as true.” That is not the question. The question is not why we should take (L) to be actually true, but wether it is logically possible that (L) be true (again, bear in mind that I don’t think your L and my solution are analogous). The solution I suggest (i.e., that just those things which were lost in the fire were things which had already lost their bookness) is clearly logically possible.
2. My solution hangs on the distinction between human persons and persons generally. That’s exactly right. Apart from being an eminently defensible distinction on its own, most universalists I’ve read themselves insist on this distinction. This is because, as far as I can tell (this is especially clear in DeRose), they want to allow that there are non-human persons (e.g., Satan and his minions) which *may* be lost forever. The only exception to this I’m aware of is Thomas Talbot, who does just what you suggest–defines his view as applying to persons generally, not humans specifically. My only reply is that my solution simply does not target those varieties of universalism that does not make the distinction.
As to your comments on the domain suggested in the texts cited. It is pretty clear to me that the context is intended to apply to at least all humans. For example, the object of the Rom 5:18 and 1 Cor is ‘anthropou’ (i.e., ‘mankind’ generically) and the object of Rom 11:32 is Jews/Gentiles. So the domain suggested by these passages is at least humanity. This is not to say, however, that the domain is restricted to humanity (if h is a subset of p, and it is true that ‘all of p are s,’ then obviously is is true that ‘all of h are s’). But I don’t see any prima facie evidence to think the domain is wider than that of humanity, though this is of course possible. Support for a wider domain would be based on much more than prima facie readings of these passages, not to mention go against traditional Christian theology, which maintains that personal salvation is offered to humans only.
Comment by camcintosh — November 10, 2011 @ 4:54 pm |
Camcintosh,
That assuages some worries. I think there’s more to be said (that’s trivial in philosophy!), but I don’t have time now. Thanks for responding.
Comment by CGibbs — November 13, 2011 @ 8:29 pm |
That you, Dr. Gibbs, for your ever insightful comments. I look forward to seeing you again soon! I hope all is well in your neck of the woods.
Comment by camcintosh — November 13, 2011 @ 9:42 pm |
Hi Chad, some thoughts (I did an admittedly quick read):
1. Traditionalism as first defined (p.1) speaks of some *persons* being in hell, but then later is defined as some *humans* will be in hell.
2. I would think universalism would claim that all humans *who have ever lived* will be in heaven with God. Moreprecisely, the set of humans who are “dead” in Adam is identical, element for element, with the set “made alive in Christ.” You seem to read “all humans will be saved” as “all those in heaven will be human.” But, since you’re taking the “all” passages at face value, then since the Bible says “all” have sinned, this ties the “all” to being “in Adam.” And that set is identical with the “all” in Christ.
3. Universalism also speaks of *all creation* being reconciled and, presumably, the persons who loose their humanity (I leave aside my worries that identity of *person* is not retained through the loss of humanity) are *created*. Thus some created persons will not be reconciled. Indeed, Robin Parry and others think *Satan* will be saved if, indeed, Satan is a created person.
4. This seems to assume limited atonement! For universalists will want to say that those Jesus died for will enter heaven.
5. Some universalists think John 6 teaches that no one can come to the Father unless they are drawn, and if they are drawn they are raised on the last day, and *all* people are drawn (if I am lifted up, will I not draw *all* men to myself).
6. Universalists might mean that humans are saved from the effect and consequences (plural) of *sin* (hell being merely one consequence (singular)).
7. Since it would be unjust to punish a person for a crime s/he did not commit, there must be identity between the person who sinned here on earth and the one who suffers in hell for those sins. However, some universalists will complain that it is incompatible with the loving and just God revealed in the Bible to punish a person forever for finite sins.
I’m not a universalist, but I’ve read a fair amount of their literature, and these are some responses I’d make if I were a universalist.
Thoughts?
Comment by Paul M. — November 15, 2011 @ 7:48 pm |
Paul,
Thanks for the comments! But you may have read too quickly!
1. The definitions of traditionalism I quote, which I think are fairly representative, are ambiguous about the humans/persons distinction (note that they do not use the word “persons” as you say). This is all I need for the argument to get off the ground, for it is precisely this ambiguity my argument takes advantage of. But a charitable and plausible reading of those definitions (especially the contexts in which they occur in the books) construes them as referring to humans.
2. For any apparently human person at any time, it is possible that that person is not human. This strikes me as preposterous—I know a human when I see one! But all the Traditionalist Defense needs is to say that it’s logically possible. And certainly it’s possible. The problem of other minds illustrates this. Even if we are justified in thinking there are other minds, that doesn’t mean that it’s not possible that there aren’t other minds. They could all be cleverly disguised robots. For any “person” you see, it’s possible that they be a cleverly disguised robot. Similarly, for any person at any time that is apparently human, it is possible that they are not human. Indeed, it is possible that only humans died in Adam, and so only humans be made alive in Christ. Those that are not made alive in Christ did not die in Adam, and so were not human, but only apparently human. This is just to restate my answer to the Damning Objection.
3. The view developed was only aimed at the “home run” universalist passages that talk about humans, not the weaker passages that talk about all things. I’m considering the most general form of universalism I can, which refers to the salvation of humans, not persons generically (the only universalist I know of, barring crazy internet folk, who intentionally gears his definition of universalsim toward persons generically is Talbott). And all universalists maintain that considered collectively the unifying message of the passages I quote is at least that “all humans will be saved.”
4. It does not presuppose limited atonement; in fact, it is the flat out denial of limited atonement. Limited atonement (typically) asserts that the benefits of Christ’s death are not made available to all humans, but a select group of humans. The view I develop says that the benefits of Christ’s death are made available to all and only humans, because there are no unsaved humans.
5. Right, all and only men are lifted. Those that aren’t are not men.
6. Agreed.
7. Right—the personal identity is preserved by virtue of humans being essentially persons.
Comment by camcintosh — November 16, 2011 @ 1:19 am |
Hi Chad! Thanks for the response.
1. Yes, I was just pointing out the ambiguity, it’s not as rigorous with it and lends to confusions. They do not use the word ‘persons,’ but you have them using the word ‘people.’ I’m not sure if my confused reading was implausible or uncharitable, but that aside . . . here’s a worry: You claim that “a charitable and plausible reading of those [traditionalist] definitions (especially the contexts in which they occur in the books) construes them as referring to humans. ” Your claim, then, is that traditionalism is the view that “some humans will be in hell.” Your argument, though, is that no humans will be in hell, which is how you define universalism. Traditionalism is wrong, it turns out!
T =df Construed plausibly and charitably, traditionalism maintains that some humans will be in hell.
U =df No humans will be in hell.
Thus your conclusion is odd; for it states that universalist passages “don’t entail what universalists think they do—namely, that traditionalism is false.” If traditionalism is some persons will be in hell, regardless of whether they’re human or not, why hamstring universalism with the view that only humans won’t be in hell, but it may well be full of persons God created? That seems an odd way to understand universalism.
2. I don’t buy this. First, on libertarianism or Arminianism, it seems to me that any human I see it is possible that they could end up in heaven or hell. Humans have libertarian free will, and presumably can accept or reject the saving work of Christ for them. So, you need a premise that: For any human, H, it is impossible for H to resist God’s grace and end up in hell. Now, how does God, on libertarianism, ensure this outcome?
Second, it seems your argument assumes that humans lose their humanity due to sin, perhaps through a cumulation of humanity-destroying free sinful choices. So, if n is the limit of humanity-destroying free sinful choices, then any human who commits n+1 free sinful choices loses their humanity thereafter. So it seems to me that, at a minimum, all babies are human (for what did they do to lose their humanity, and how can two humans have a non-human baby?). You seem to suggest this in your response to the ‘Damning Objection.’ There you had books (humans) that were at some time defaced to such an extent that they ceased to be books (humans). You make this point clear when you write: “The answer could still truthfully be ‘all of them,’ supposing that it is possible for some human persons to cease to be human before they enter hell” (emphasis mine).
Thus, if they were humans at some time and, as you say above, “it is possible that only humans died in Adam,” then since the universalist argument is that the set of those in Adam, {A}, and the set of those in Christ, {C}, have identical members, i.e., ∀x (x ∈ {A} → x ∈ {C}), then the set of heaven-dwellers, {H}, are identical to: {A} U {C} = {H}, and you seem to have undercut your own argument.
So you’d need a premise like this: No one in hell was ever a human. And that strikes me as false. You’d need to say that all those killed in the flood either went to heaven or were not human, for it seems God refers to all of them as mankind. We also need to wonder about murder and Genesis 9. You’d also need to say that Judas wasn’t a man, but: “The Son of Man will go as it has been decreed. But woe to that man who betrays him!” and “While he was still speaking a crowd came up, and the man who was called Judas, one of the Twelve, was leading them. He approached Jesus to kiss him.”
3. Colossians 1 is a “homerun passage.” Also, virtually every universalist I have read (not crazy internet ones), have claimed that Satan would, if he’s a person, eventually be saved. So, as Robin Parry writes, “Is the Devil a personal being? Suppose that he is (perhaps he is a fallen angel, although Scripture never spells out his origins). If Satan was once a good spiritual person who was later corrupted then the logic of my position is indeed that God could and would redeem him.” I suppose Talbott talks that way because he’s more philosophically careful on this matter than most. Origen thought Satan would be saved and so did Gregory of Nyssa, and DeRose says he’s only considering the proposition that all humans will be saved, but thinks that the position that if Satan is a person, then he will be saved, deserves serious consideration. It seems your understanding of the universalist position is culled solely from DeRose’s online article where he stipulates the kind of universalism he’ll defend, probably in part to make his job easier.
4. I don’t think so, see #2. If universal atonement is that Christ died for all humans, and if, as you say, those in hell lost their humanity, then they were humans at one point, and thus members of the set of those Christ died for. Moreover, it seems you have “sincere offer” issues. For it looks as if you tell all those you meet that Jesus died for them and they can avail themselves of his blood. But, if you’re claiming that he only died for humans, and, some people you meet aren’t humans, then there’s no provision for them. As a Calvinist, I have no problem with limited atonement or charges of insincere offers
, but as a non-Calvinist you can’t allow this. But maybe you will, you’ve already implicitly affirmed irresistible grace!
5. Falls by similar arguments as made above.
6. What do you mean “agreed?” Since “losing humanity” is a severe consequence of sin, indeed, a damning one, then it’s not true that all humans are saved from the consequences of their sin, for it’s not true that all humans retain their humanity.
Yikes, longer than I planned!
Comment by Paul M. — November 16, 2011 @ 1:22 pm |
Good thoughts, Paul. Point 2 seems to be pushing in the direction of a real difficulty with the view.
But let’s keep perspective: if right, what point 2 would force me to abandon is only the claim that the view allows us to accept the home run passages at face value (I know, I know; that was, after all, my thesis!). It is always possible to qualify x ∈ {C} such that would make the conditional false–but that, admittedly, reverts to much of what the traditionalist wants to say. Nevertheless, even if we drop the claim that the view allows us to accept universalists passages at face value, I think there is still a lot to be said for the view in general.
The other points, however, don’t strike me as very significant. But I’m out of stamina. Thanks for thinking about this so carefully!
Comment by camcintosh — November 20, 2011 @ 3:16 am |
Thanks Chad. I’m staminaed-out too.
Comment by Paul M. — November 22, 2011 @ 6:26 pm |
I’d briefly add that . . . As for the view in general. I appreciate it, but I’m of the position that we can’t totally lose the imago dei. I’m also unsure how identity is retained, but this gets into our modal intuitions on these matters. I’m not sure that a non-human me is identical to the “me” in the actual world. Like Bas van Fraassen once said: “They tell me that it’s possible for me to climb this building. I say, ‘What, you’re crazy.’ They say, ‘No, there’s a possible world where you are able to climb it.’ I say, “Hmm, okay, but in what sense is it *me* who climbs it.’” Admittedly, Bas is a modal anti-realist, but I still think there’s something to that. In any case, I do think you’re right to posit a diminished imago, perhaps in a Thomistic or Aristotelian way. Consider a dull knife, it’s still a knif, but it’s not a good knife. It’s not a properly functioning knife. I think something like this is closer to what I think about the humans
in hell.
Thanks again.
Comment by Paul M. — November 22, 2011 @ 6:32 pm |